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A Different Perspective of Earnings Management 
UNE PERSPECTIVE DIFFERENTE SUR LA GESTION DE PROFITS 
Ning Yaping1 
 
Abstract:  Many maintain that earnings management is harmful. Arguing that this is untrue, the 
paper studies the benefits of earnings management to firms’ various contracting parties and 
investors, as well as the benefits on social resource allocation. The results of this research have 
important implication for regulators and lawmakers. 
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Résumé: Beaucoup de gens pensent que la gestion de profits est nuisible. Argumentant que ce point 
de vue est faux, cet article étudie les bénéfices de la gestion de profits pour les différentes parties de 
l’entreprise, les investisseurs ainsi que l’allucation des ressources sociales. Les résultats de cette 
recherche revêtissent une grande importance pour les dirigeants et les législateurs. 
Mots-Clés: gestion de profits, fraude, valeur ajoutée 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION  
 
Earnings manipulation is management’s action taken to 
bring reported earnings to a desired level. Earnings 
manipulation has three mutually exclusive forms: 
earnings management, earnings fraud, and creative 
accounting. When earnings manipulation is performed 
through exercising the discretion accorded by 
accounting standards and corporate laws, and/or 
structuring activities in such a way that expected firm 
value is not affected negatively, it is earnings 
management, otherwise it is earnings fraud. Creative 
accounting is the earnings manipulation that does not 
violate accounting standards or corporate laws because 
of the lack of relevant standards or laws, for example, 
when firms engage in business innovations. (Ning, 
2005) 
Motivated mainly by the fact that almost all 
academics – including those who realize that earnings 
management is not a fraud – condemn earnings 
management, this paper intends to refute the claim that 
earnings management is harmful, justify the wealth 
transfer due to earnings management, and study the 
value-adding functions of earnings management. The 
paper proceeds as follows. The next section illustrates 
the objections against earnings management in prior 
literature. Section three argues for earnings 
management from various perspectives, while section 
four recommends actions towards earnings 
management. The final section summarizes and 
explains the contributions. 
 
2.   OBJECTIONS AGAINST EARNINGS 
MANAGEMENT 
 
The litigious climate in the U.S. is such that 
management teams tend to avoid any discussions even 
remotely linking the two concepts of earnings 
management and management fraud (Brown, 1999), 
while earnings manipulation is perceived by managers 
to be an acceptable practice (Elitzur & Yaari, 1995). In 
the literature there has occurred little research arguing 
for earnings management. 2  Instead, most academics 
adopt hostile attitudes towards earnings management. 
An explanation to this phenomenon is that earnings 
management is mistaken for either earnings fraud or 
creative accounting. 
Earnings management is well-known for four 
accuses as follows. First, earnings management is a 
fraud. Second, earnings management leads to the 
representational unfaithfulness of financial statements. 
Third, earnings management implies deviousness and 
unethical actions (Brown, 1999) as it intends to fool or 
mislead users of earnings information. Fourth, earnings 
management has wealth redistributive effects among 
related parties, for example, making managers better off 
at the expense of shareholders.  
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earnings management has a positive side (see Schipper, 1989), 
although she did not proceed further or deeper into the subject.  
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3.  ARGUING FOR EARNINGS 
MANAGEMENT 
 
Many maintain that earnings manipulation is a harmful 
activity (Ziv, 1998), yet this is only partially true. Of the 
three forms of earnings manipulation, earnings fraud is 
harmful, creative accounting might be harmful, but 
earnings management is not harmful. This section 
intends to argue for earnings management from the 
following five aspects: representational faithfulness is 
only a relative concept, earnings management is not 
fraudulent and does not misrepresent firm’s economic 
position or value, the wealth transfers due to earnings 
management are justifiable, and earnings management 
can be value adding.  
 
3.1  Representational Faithfulness Is a 
Relative Concept 
Representational faithfulness is a relative rather than 
absolute issue. It is impossible for financial statements 
to be 100 percent faithful to firm’s economic or 
underlying value for at least two reasons. First, 
accounting standards involve subjective judgments. To 
account for the same thing, even people of the same 
background might arrive at different judgments. This 
means that even if managers have no intention to distort 
financial reporting, some deviations from the 
underlying firm value might occur. Thus, 100-percent 
faithfulness is only a theoretical and impractical concept 
just like “perfect competition”. Second, when managers 
have private information and are allowed not to share 
with others, and when problems such as management 
compensation, tax liability and financing in capital 
markets draw on accounting numbers, nobody except 
management and/or people involved in the preparation 
of the financial reports will know the true earnings. This 
implies that outsiders have no ground to judge if 
financial statements represent a firm’s true economic 
position.  
Hence, faithfulness defined in terms of the 
representation of underlying firm value is immeasurable. 
However, with the definition proposed by Ning (2005), 
representational faithfulness can be directly measured 
via the compliance with accounting standards and 
corporate laws: a financial report is faithful if the data in 
the report are presented within the constraints of 
accounting standards and corporate laws. The only 
criterion to determine the quality of accounting 
information is how well accounting standards are 
followed in the preparation of financial reports.  
“Information unfaithfulness” and “information 
distortion” are two different but related concepts. 
Unfaithful information is resulted from either 
information asymmetry or information distortion. Marin 
et al. (2002) states that earnings management has 
crossed the boundary between objective reporting and 
outright fraudulent financial reporting, namely, 
reporting under earnings management is neither 
objective nor fraudulent. Although earnings 
management impairs truthful reporting, financial 
reports with earnings management are still relevant, 
reliable and comparable. And this is the best we can do 
so far. 
 
3.2  Earnings Management Is Not a Fraud 
Earnings management is not a fraud. Fraud is an “act of 
criminal deception”(Hornby, 1974) or a “deceitful 
behavior which may be punished by law” (Procter, 
1978). Namely, fraud is an unlawful or illegitimate 
conduct. Earnings management is within legitimate 
constraints, implying that the deviation of reported 
earnings from underlying or economic earnings due to 
earnings management is legitimate or authorized by 
accounting standards and corporate laws. Just like 
legitimate tax avoidance is above criticism, so should 
earnings management. Fraud and representational 
unfaithfulness are two related but different issues. Fraud 
is an act or behavior, while representational 
unfaithfulness is a feature or quality of reports. 
Difference between reported earnings and economic 
earnings could result from either illegitimate or 
legitimate actions. Thus, it is incorrect to say that 
earnings management is fraudulent because it results in 
such a difference. 
On the other hand, earnings fraud is a cheating and 
immoral conduct. Examples of the cheating devices 
include forging documents, fictitiously recognizing 
revenues, bribing, and illegitimate transactions between 
a parent company and its subsidiary. The relationship 
between earnings management and earnings fraud is not 
like the pot calling the kettle black. It is true that both 
earnings management and earnings fraud lead to 
presentational infidelity, however, earnings fraud causes 
the infidelity by violating accounting standards or 
corporate laws while earnings management does it by 
making the most of the standards and laws. That is why 
Magrath & Weld (2002) acknowledges that some 
earnings management (or rather, earnings manipulation) 
techniques are not fraudulent. In opposition to what 
Landsittel (2000) states about the difference between 
earnings management and fraudulent financial reporting 
– the former presumes that the reporting results are not 
“materially misrepresented” while the latter does, it is 
claimed here that the difference between earnings 
management and earnings fraud is not the degree of 
presentational faithfulness but the legitimacy of the 
practice. That is why earnings fraud should be 
denounced while earnings management should not. 
 
3.3  Earnings Management Does Not 
Misrepresent Firm Value 
Many hold that earnings management misrepresents (i.e. 
overstates or understates) firm’s periodic performance 
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and economic position (e.g. Goel & Thakor, 2003). I 
argue that, except firm’s periodic earnings performance, 
earnings management does not misrepresent firm value 
or firm’s periodic economic position. Firms have 
incentives to manage reported earnings downward when 
economic earnings are above the level they desire. The 
part of earnings managed downward builds up an 
invisible reserve of earnings, and is hidden in inventory, 
sales returns, loan losses, warranty costs, R&D 
expenses, and other line items of financial statements. 
In the presence of this hidden earnings reserve, firms are 
able to manage current period’s earnings upward when 
it is below the desired level. As a result, earnings 
management may result in the misrepresentation of 
reported earnings performance in terms of individual 
time periods. However, earnings management does not 
misrepresent firm’s economic position of each 
individual period. The economic position of a firm in a 
period is represented by the total value of its assets, 
owner’s equity and liability of that period. When 
earnings are managed downward, the part of earnings 
unreported is reserved in or transferred to some other 
line items, such as inventory, R&D and provisions. The 
managed decline of earnings is accompanied by the rise 
of the line items concerned at the exact amount; hence 
the invisible transfer does not change the underlying or 
economic position of the firm in that period. When 
earnings are managed upward, the increase of current 
period’s reported earnings is accompanied by the 
decline of the line item(s) where earnings of previous 
period(s) has been reserved at the exact amount; namely 
the increase of reported earnings under earnings 
management is not made-up or groundless.  
Earnings is a continuous variable despite that 
outsiders tend to regard it as a discrete variable (Patel & 
Zeckhauser, 1999). According to Ziv (1998), earnings 
management is a process of manipulating the time 
profile of earnings while not changing the reported 
earnings over the long run. Disregarding the benefits 
from earnings management such as tax savings 3  or 
lower-cost external financing, the aggregated firm value 
in the long run or the future cash flow is not 
misrepresented under earnings management, because 
the increase (or decrease) of reported earnings is 
accompanied by a decline (or rise) in some other line 
items reported at the exact amount.  
Earnings management is not immoral or unethical. 
Although earnings management is meant to modify the 
behavior of earnings-information users, it is far from 
fooling or misleading the users of financial statements. 
                                                        
3  Earnings management has limited effect on tax savings. 
While real earnings management has an effect on both 
accounting income (i.e. income determined by accounting 
principles) and taxable income (i.e. income determined by tax 
laws) – hence tax expenses, paper earnings management has 
little effect on tax expenses mainly because income tax 
expenses are based on taxable income rather than accounting 
income.  
In dictionaries 4 , to fool is to deceive or to cause 
someone to accept as true what is false while to mislead 
is to guide or lead wrongly. Unlike earnings fraud, 
earnings management does not create fictitious amount 
of earnings, rather, it legitimately allocates the true 
amount in more than one line items besides earnings in 
order to “smooth” reported earnings across accounting 
periods. Though the amount in a certain line item may 
be untrue, the economic position and firm value are 
faithful. Managers’ accrual decisions may result in 
earnings management (Dechow & Skinner, 2000), or 
earnings management incorporates accruals-based 
manipulation of economic earnings by managers (Evans 
III & Sridhar, 1996; Jaggi & Lee, 2002). In addition, 
accounting conservatism may result in the practice of 
managing earnings downward. If accrual decisions and 
accounting conservatism are regarded as ethical, so 
should other techniques of earnings management. 
 
3.4  Wealth Transfers Due to Earnings 
Management Are Justifiable 
Many academics posit that earnings management 
induces wealth transfers. Watts & Zimmerman (1986; 
1990), Smith (1993) and Jiambalvo (1996) claim a 
wealth transfer from debtholders to shareholders when 
management changes accounting choices to avoid the 
violation of debt covenants. Watts & Zimmerman (1990) 
and Schipper & Vincent (2003) assume that overstated 
earnings result in wealth transfer to managers from 
other contracting parties if earnings are used as an 
indicator of managers’ performance. Dye (1988) 
suggests a wealth transfer from investors (i.e. potential 
or future shareholders) to shareholders under earnings 
management. The effect of the wealth transfer from 
investors to shareholders is the basis of the SEC’s strong 
opposition against earnings management. 
The hostility towards earnings management for debt 
contracts mainly arises from the belief that firms’ 
reported risk is higher than their real risk if earnings are 
managed. However this is untrue. Earnings 
management does not misrepresent firm’s economic 
position or future cash flow, the increase of reported 
earnings for meeting debt covenants, rather than being 
made-up, is from the earnings reserve hidden in some 
other line items. When management changes 
accounting choices within the constraints of accounting 
standards to avoid the violation of debt covenants, a 
win-win situation occurs: shareholders are better off 
when the violation of debt covenants is avoided, while 
debtholders are better off when firms maximize their 
chances of meeting the covenants because the times of 
getting investment returns are maximised. 
I find it difficult to convince myself to take the same 
attitude towards earnings management as SEC’s due to 
the following facts. First, since earnings management 
                                                        
4 For example, Hornby, 1974; Procter, 1987 
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does not misrepresent firm value or periodic economic 
position, it hardly distorts investors’ beliefs about firms’ 
future economic prospects. Thus the alleged wealth 
transfer from investors to shareholders due to earnings 
management, if there is any, will be insignificant. 
Second, rational investors attain their perceptions of a 
firm on the aggregate firm value rather than the single 
reported earnings figure alone; and they are sophistical 
enough, according to Ziv (1998) and Dechow & Skinner 
(2000), to reverse financial statements (e.g. undo or 
apply some discount to firms’ accounting choices) and 
infer the information that underlined the provided 
disclosure. Moreover, technological advances enable 
them to have low-cost access to some requisite 
information (e.g. the information available at virtually 
zero cost through corporate web sites). Firms cannot be 
blamed for earnings management if imprudent or 
inexperienced investors make their decisions based on 
the reported earnings figure alone. The people who the 
SEC protects should be rational investors. Third, to 
SEC, firms have ‘original sin’ because they are born 
with the ability to fraud although they might choose not 
to do so. However, I claim that firms’ right should also 
be protected if they walk the chalks. Fourth, accrual 
accounting generates more useful information for 
investors to assess economic performance and predict 
future cash flows than cash-flow accounting because it 
helps dampen the fluctuations in a firm’s underlying 
cash flows (Dechow & Skinner, 2000), this means that 
managed earnings may sometimes be more useful to 
investors than unmanaged earnings. Nevertheless, 
generally speaking, only a small portion of the 
variability in stock returns is explained by accounting 
numbers (Fields et al., 2001). 
It is said that when earnings are used to measure 
management performance, overstated earnings cause 
wealth to be transferred from shareholders to managers 
(Watts & Zimmerman, 1990). However, because 
earnings overstated via earnings management is not 
forged but from the hidden earnings reserve, such a 
transfer is not immoral, especially when management 
performance of the year has been negatively affected by 
uncontrollable factors such as market. Firms with 
hidden earnings reserve have a comparative advantage 
in organizing their reported earnings information so as 
to avoid some temporary business risks. Earnings 
gained in an accounting period exceeding the upper 
bound of compensation scheme means that management 
has outperformed shareholders’ expectation in the 
period. When management shift the surplus of current 
earnings via earnings management to future periods, the 
probability of their future earnings within the bounds is 
enhanced. This can be regarded as a special bonus that 
management deserves. Although the benefit gained is 
not at the expense of shareholders, shareholders may be 
worse off when earnings management is not practiced. 
Nevertheless, managers should not be blamed or 
punished if their hidden earnings reserves are built up 
via earnings management rather than earnings fraud. 
There are two other undocumented types of wealth 
transfers due to earnings management: from financially 
troubled firms to healthy firms, and from firms with 
poorer management to firms with better management. 
Having a hidden earnings reserve or being able to take 
some of the current gains to future signals firm’s 
financial strength. Other things being equal, firms with 
hidden earnings reserves are likely to have greater 
capability to generate profits, avoid risks and develop 
sustainable competitive advantages in future than firms 
without such reserves. This is because they have greater 
potential, for example, to attain the thresholds of stock 
offerings, to avoid the violation of debt covenants, and 
to satisfy regulatory requirements.5 On the other hand, 
not all economically strong firms conduct earnings 
management. Whether to exercise the discretion 
permitted by accounting standards and corporate laws 
and how well the discretion is used reflect if 
management is professional. Management that conducts 
earnings management well is likely to be better at 
maximizing firm value than management that does not 
do it. This is because the former tends to be more skilful 
at financing, averting risks, minimizing tax expenses 
and/or losses due to reasons such as government 
scrutiny. Alternatively, whether to do earnings 
management reflects management’s ability to acquire, 
effectively employ and create resources. In current 
competitive environment, the survival and sustainable 
development of firms largely depend on how well they 
acquire, employ and create resources. Therefore, 
economically stronger firms and firms with better 
management deserve higher share prices and better 
credit terms. From this perspective, earnings 
management is efficient because it helps resources to be 
properly allocated for economic growth, and financial 
statements with earnings management function as a 
signal, distinguishing economically stronger firms and 
firms with better management from others.  
In contrast, earnings fraud causes inefficient 
resource allocation because fraudulent financial 
reporting diverts resources from substantive projects 
with actual expected payoffs to chimerical projects with 
fake expected payoffs (Schipper & Vincent, 2003). 
Fraudulently overstated earnings mask deteriorating 
solvency, misleading lenders to continue lending or 
defer foreclosure. Gains from capital market through 
earnings fraud resemble booty from robbery. The wealth 
transfer as a result of earnings fraud is illegal and 
immoral, hence earnings fraud deserves condemnation 
and punishment. 
 
                                                        
5  In the United States, for example, banking regulations 
require that U.S. banks satisfy certain capital adequacy 
requirements that are written in terms of accounting numbers. 
Insurance regulations require that insurers meet conditions for 
minimum financial health. Utilities have historically been 
rate-regulated and permitted to earn only a normal return on 
their invested assets. (Healy & Wahlen, 1999) 
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3.5  Earnings Management Is Value Adding 
According to Magrath & Weld (2002), good business 
practice requires managers to manage earnings. Being 
part of risk-aversion or value-maximization scheme, 
earnings management helps firms reduce the risk of 
breaking debt covenants, stock thresholds, and 
regulated requirements when there is, for example, an 
unexpected change in input prices. When the difference 
between attaining and missing the threshold of stock 
offering, debt covenant, or regulated requirement is just 
a few cents, the marginal benefits of earnings 
management increase sharply as earnings are managed 
from a small shortfall to a small surplus of the threshold 
point. In this case, firms that do not conduct earnings 
management bear sharply higher costs in transactions 
with shareholders or debtholders. Viewing from a 
different perspective, earnings management helps firms 
to attract low-cost financing, obtain high stock prices, 
avoid political and labour negotiations costs, and 
minimize tax expenses. Accordingly, earnings 
management is firms’ value-maximization tool. 
Trueman & Titman (1988) find that highly perceived 
earnings volatility increases the perceived bankruptcy 
probability of the firm and hence its borrowing costs. 
Firms with smooth earnings are typically rewarded in 
the stock market (Magrath & Weld, 2002), because they 
are priced at a premium to other firms (Myers & Skinner, 
1999; Barth et al., 1999) and discourage speculators. 
Accordingly, earnings management is firms’ tool to 
maximize shareholder value. Demski et al. (1984), Arya 
et al. (1998) and Dutta & Gigler (2002) provide 
evidence that shareholders are better off with managed 
earnings. No wonder why Dye (1988) claims that 
shareholders have a demand for earnings management. 
As has been explained earlier, debtholders are better off 
if earnings management helps their borrowers reduce 
the probability of covenant violation. Efficient 
contracting suggests that, although financial reporting 
discretion may allow managers to increase their 
compensation, such discretion also improves the 
alignment of their interests with those of shareholders 
(Watts & Zimmerman, 1986) and debtholders. 
According to Black (1993), earnings are smoothed 
to increase the association between reported earnings 
and firm value, hence smoothing earnings makes the 
reported earnings figure more informative. Rather than 
misleading investors in capital markets, earnings 
management helps them form rational expectations 
about firm value because firms that are engaged in 
earnings management are likely to be economically 
stronger and/or with better management. In addition, 
managing earnings to reduce the perceived volatility of 
firms’ earnings stream is beneficial to investors because 
it discourages welfare-reducing information acquisition 
by speculators. Zero earnings management, according 
to Dechow & Skinner (2000), is clearly not an optimal 
solution in capital markets. 
 
4.  SUGGESTED ACTIONS TOWARDS 
EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
 
The results of this research have important implication 
for regulators and lawmakers. Regulators tend to regard 
earnings management as harmful and in the need of 
immediate remedial action (Dechow & Skinner, 2000). 
The SEC is always against any type of earnings 
manipulation. This will remain to be the case, as 
Dechow & Skinner (2000) speculates, even if financial 
statements and related disclosures included sufficient 
detail to allow investors to adjust for earnings 
management. The SEC’s explanation to this is its 
mandate to ensure that stock exchange is fair to buyers. 
However, it is SEC’s job to work for the best interests of 
every lawful and rational market participant. Market 
participants include not only buyers but also sellers. 
Being within legitimate constraints, earnings 
management is beyond criticism, hence should not be 
identified as a target of regulators’ enforcement actions.  
Achilles cannot blame others for taking advantages 
of his heel because people are opportunistic. For the 
same reason, it gives no cause for much criticism if 
managers take advantages of the inadequacies of 
accounting standards and exploit their ability to manage 
reported earnings, and it is inappropriate to say that 
taking the advantage of the inadequacies is to subvert 
the intent of the standards. It is the standard makers who 
should hold responsible. The quality of financial 
statements is an indirect indicator of the quality of 
accounting standards (Schipper & Vincent, 2003). If 
the inadequacies of standards cannot be eliminated, one 
just has to learn to live with earnings management. Zero 
earnings manipulation is impossible as long as 
compensation scheme, tax payment, debt contracts, 
stock offering, labor negotiation and regulatory 
monitoring are not independent of accounting data; and 
when there are information asymmetry, accounting 
flexibility and management’s reporting discretions.  
Instead, efforts should be made to improve antifraud 
programs. Useful mechanisms for the purpose include 
internal controls, audits’ check, regulatory bodies’ 
monitoring, and financial analysts’ scrutiny. In addition, 
accounting policymakers and standard-setters need to 
examine how the current standards can allow abusive 
manipulation of accounting numbers, and strive to 
reduce the subjectivity or ambiguity in accounting 
standards and enable the standards to cope with 
business innovations. The less subjectivity and 
ambiguity accounting standards have, the less potential 
of earnings manipulation. The ambiguity in accounting 
standards might lead to substantial disagreement as to 
what is within versus outside the bounds of acceptable 
reporting. Reporting allegations against Waste 
Management, Cendant, and Sunbeam, for example, are 
cases in point, where courts will ultimately decide 
whether management crossed the line. (Brown, 1999) 
Moreover, standard setters need to keep pace with the 
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accelerating changes in business practices so as to 
prevent accounting recognition from lagging economic 
events and minimize the opportunities for creative 
accounting practices. 
 
5.   CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Everything has two sides. Previous literature on 
earnings manipulation, however, seems one-sided 
because it focuses primarily, if not solely, on earnings 
fraud and creative accounting, though named as 
‘earnings management’. Representing a significant 
departure from traditional researches, the paper offers a 
systematic study on the positive side of earnings 
manipulation and suggests that hostile attitudes towards 
earnings management are inappropriate. The disputes 
expected to arise from this paper are likely to improve 
the understanding of earnings management.  
Future research opportunities include the study of 
the guidelines for determining the impact on expected 
firm value by real earnings manipulation (e.g. the 
impact of accelerating R&D expenses on the expected 
firm value), the empirical measurement of the impact, 
and empirical studies on the validity of the proposed 
definitions and the value-adding characteristics of 
earnings management. 
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